This paper characterizes the optimal policy within a dynamic search model of the labor market with risk-averse workers. In a …rst-best allocation of resources, unemployment bene…ts should provide perfect insurance against the unemployment risk, layo¤ taxes are necessary to induce employers to internalize the cost of dismissing an employee but should not be too high in order to allow a desirable reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs, hiring subsidies are needed to partially o¤set the adverse impact of layo¤ taxes on job creation and payroll taxes should be approximately equal to zero. I derive an optimal rate of unemployment and show that it is lower when the unemployment risk is partly non-insurable. Importantly, the optimal level of layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies is independent of the amount of government expenditures to …nance, even in a second-best environment.
Introduction
The design of labor market institutions is widely believed to be among the key determinants of the economic success or failure of a nation. There is nevertheless no consensus among economists about the optimal design of such institutions and, in many industrialized countries, the subject remains at the center of considerable controversies among policy makers. In particular, there appear to be a fundamental trade-o¤ between the demand for insurance of risk-averse workers and the macroeconomic e¢ ciency of the labor market which should allocate workers to the jobs where they are going to be most productive. Hence, a typical concern is that government interventions aimed at improving insurance, such as the provision of unemployment bene…ts or employment protection, might also have adverse consequences for aggregate production.
Search frictions are a major source of the trade-o¤ between insurance and production 1 since they generate some unemployment and they prevent an immediate reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs. A macroeconomic framework is required to analyze this trade-o¤ as search frictions induce non-trivial general equilibrium e¤ects on job creation and job destruction which are key to the reallocation process of workers. Furthermore, wages could be a¤ected by macroeconomic variables such as the expected length of an unemployment spell. These general equilibrium e¤ects imply that di¤erent labor market policy instruments do interact among each other. They therefore jointly in ‡uence the provision of insurance and the e¢ ciency of production. A search model à la Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) with risk-averse workers captures all the above features and allows for a joint analysis of the di¤erent policy instruments. In this paper, I therefore rely on such a framework to determine the main characteristics of an optimal labor market policy. Employment protection takes the form of layo¤ taxes. The government can also give hiring subsidies to encourage job creation. The generosity of unemployment insurance is determined by the level of unemployment bene…ts. Payroll taxes could be used to raise revenue. If they happen to take negative values, payroll taxes could also be seen as employment subsidies. Importantly, it is assumed throughout, as in most of the literature on the topic, that the government is the sole provider of unemployment insurance. 2 I begin by deriving the optimal allocation of resources chosen by a planner who wants 1 The other major source of the trade-o¤ is moral hazard which will be allowed towards the end of this paper. 2 The implicit contract literature has argued that risk-neutral …rms should be expected to provide unemployment bene…ts to risk-averse workers; see, for instance, Baily (1974a) or Azariadis (1975) . However, in reality, such contracts remain the exception rather than the rule. Thus, although somewhat ad-hoc, the assumption that the private market does not provide insurance seems reasonable and has the merit of making the analysis transparent. This assumption has nevertheless been relaxed in the optimal policy analyses of Fella (2007) and Chetty Saez (2008) .
to maximize the welfare of workers subject to matching frictions and to a resource constraint. In this ideal setup, full insurance is provided and aggregate output, net of recruitment costs, is maximized. It turns out that this …rst-best allocation could be implemented in a decentralized economy when workers are wage takers. To obtain an e¢ cient rate of job destruction, layo¤ taxes should induce …rms to internalize the social costs and bene…ts of dismissing a worker. The costs consist of the unemployment bene…ts that will need to be paid and of the forgone payroll taxes; while the bene…t corresponds to the value of a desirable reallocation of the worker from a low to a high productivity job. Hiring subsidies are needed to partially o¤set the negative impact of layo¤ taxes on job creation. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, payroll taxes should optimally be approximately equal to zero. Thus, both unemployment bene…ts and hiring subsidies are almost entirely …nanced from layo¤ taxes.
I then consider a number of deviations from this …rst-best benchmark. First, I show that additional government expenditures, to provide public goods for instance, should be exclusively …nanced through higher payroll taxes and lower unemployment bene…ts, even if this induces a downward distortion to the participation decision of workers. Layo¤ taxes should therefore be seen as a Pigouvian instrument which corrects for ine¢ ciencies in the rate of job destruction, not as a source of revenue to the government. I then turn to the possibility of a non-insurable utility cost of unemployment. In this context, it is optimal to reduce the rate of unemployment, which acts as a substitute to the provision of insurance through unemployment bene…ts. However, the lower rate of unemployment slows down the reallocation of workers and therefore fails to maximize output. This illustrates the conceptual distinction between the welfare maximizing optimal rate of unemployment 3 derived in this paper and the output maximizing rate of unemployment which is central to the search-matching literature. I then rely on numerical simulations to explore the optimal policy when workers have some bargaining power. As the provision of insurance tends to be insu¢ cient, the planner wants to reduce market tightness in order to decrease wages which, by relaxing the resource constraint, allows an increase in the level of unemployment bene…ts. This is achieved by setting layo¤ taxes higher than hiring subsidies in order to discourage the entry of …rms with a vacant position. I then allow for moral hazard which generates the opposite possibility that insurance may be too high, in which case the planner wants to increase market tightness. However, the simulations reveal that under-insurance remains the main concern whenever workers have substantial bargaining power. Thus, moral hazard does not seem to be the most important feature of the fundamental trade-o¤ between the provision of insurance and the level of aggregate production. General equi-librium e¤ects on wages and on job creation and job destruction seem to be at least as important.
This paper is related to the extensive economic literature on optimal labor market institutions. The main strand of this literature is on optimal unemployment insurance. In their seminal work, Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) focused on a single unemployment spell and derived the optimal time pro…le of unemployment bene…ts when moral hazard introduces a trade-o¤ between the provision of insurance and incentives to search. By contrast, Baily (1974b) and Chetty (2006) focused on the level of bene…ts, rather than their time pro…le, in a framework which allows for multiple spells. Importantly, these contributions assume that unemployment bene…ts are exclusively …nanced from payroll taxes and abstract from general equilibrium e¤ects.
The literature on employment protection is mostly positive, rather than normative. The crux of the academic debate is about the impact of layo¤ taxes on the level of employment; with the underlying presumption that layo¤ taxes are desirable if they decrease the number of jobless. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) showed, in a partial equilibrium context, that …ring costs have a larger impact on job destruction than on job creation and should therefore be bene…cial for employment. This conclusion was challenged by the general equilibrium analysis with employment lotteries of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) . Ljungqvist (2002) showed that, in search models à la Mortensen-Pissarides, layo¤ costs increase employment if initial wages are negotiated before a match is formed, while the opposite is true if bargaining only occurs after the match is formed. Importantly, these contributions either assume that workers are risk-neutral or that …nancial markets are complete. Hence, they do not generate any trade-o¤ between insurance and production e¢ ciency and cannot give sensible measures of the welfare implications of layo¤ taxes. These analyses are therefore hardly informative about the optimal level of employment protection.
While most papers ignore the interaction between di¤erent policy instruments, there are two important exceptions which are closely related to this work. First, Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) 4 analyze labor market policies in a dynamic search model with riskneutral workers. Since there is no motive for insurance, the best that the government can do is to maximize output net of recruitment costs. If the Hosios (1990) condition holds, i.e. the bargaining power of workers is equal to the elasticity of the matching function, then it is optimal for the government not to intervene. While, if it does not hold, policy parameters should only be used to correct for the resulting search externalities. An important insight is that the introduction of unemployment bene…ts has a positive impact on wages and, therefore, increases job destruction. This should be o¤set by higher layo¤ taxes. Hiring subsidies should also be increased such as to leave the rate of job 4 See also Mortensen Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000, chapter 9). 4 creation unchanged. However, with risk-neutral workers, there is no trade-o¤ between insurance and production. The second closely related paper is Blanchard Tirole (2008) which proposes a joint derivation of optimal unemployment insurance and employment protection in a static context with risk-averse workers. They show in a benchmark model, which is the static counterpart to the …rst-best policy derived in this paper, that unemployment bene…ts should be entirely …nanced from layo¤ taxes, rather than payroll taxes, in order to induce …rms to internalize the cost of unemployment. 5 However, their static framework ignores the adverse e¤ect of layo¤ taxes on job creation. In fact, as I shall show, in a dynamic context the share of unemployment bene…ts …nanced from payroll taxes is determined by the job creation side of the economy, which is absent from their framework. Also, and more fundamentally, a static approach entails an entirely negative view of unemployment; whereas in a dynamic setting an unemployed worker is a useful input in the matching process. In fact, to maximize output in an economy without governmental intervention, the Hosios condition actually maximizes the rate of job destruction! Finally, this paper is also related to a small literature on policy analyses within dynamic search models of the labor market with risk-averse workers. Cahuc Lehmann (2000) , Fredriksson Holmlund (2001) and Lehmann van der Linden (2007) focus on the optimal provision of unemployment insurance under moral hazard. All three contributions pay particular attention to the general equilibrium e¤ects of unemployment insurance and to their consequences for the overall provision of insurance. Interactions with layo¤ taxes are nevertheless ignored.
Acemoglu Shimer (1999 Shimer ( , 2000 showed, in the context of directed search with riskaverse workers, that higher unemployment bene…ts could improve the quality, and productivity, of job-worker matches. By contrast, in this paper, match quality is unrelated to the length of unemployment. Alavarez Veracierto (2000, 2001 ) rely on calibrated search models with risk-averse workers to investigate the e¤ects of di¤erent labor market policies. However, their approach is entirely positive and does not attempt to characterize optimal policies. 6 In a closely related paper, Coles and Masters (2006) show that there is some complementarity between the provision of unemployment insurance and that of hiring subsidies. The idea is that, by boosting the job creation rate, subsidies exert a downward pressure on unemployment and, hence, on the cost of providing unemployment insurance. How- 5 This policy, often referred to as "experience rating", was originally proposed by Feldstein (1976 6 Ljungqvist Sargent (2008) also investigate the interactions between unemployment insurance and employment protection in a positive analysis of the labor market, but with risk-neutral workers. ever, their model does not have an endogenous job destruction margin and, therefore, cannot be used to determine the optimal level of employment protection. This paper begins, in section two, with a brief reminder of the key features of the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) framework, on which all subsequent work relies. In the following section, I derive the …rst-best policy, which then serves as a benchmark. Section four investigates how government expenditures should be …nanced when payroll taxes and layo¤ taxes are both potential sources of revenue. I then turn to the consequences of a non-insurable utility cost of unemployment. Section six relies on numerical simulations to investigate optimal policies when workers have some bargaining power. Finally, the last section deals with the consequences of moral hazard. This paper ends with a conclusion.
Search Model
Before solving for optimal policies, it is necessary to describe the main characteristics of the dynamic search model on which all subsequent work relies. The structure of the economy corresponds to the standard Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) framework. Production requires that vacant jobs and unemployed workers get matched, which occur at rate:
where u stands for the number of unemployed and v for that of vacancies. For simplicity, each …rm can employ, at most, one worker and the mass of workers is normalized to one, so that u also stands for the rate of unemployment. The matching function m is increasing in both arguments, exhibits decreasing marginal product to each input and satis…es constant returns to scale. It follows from this last assumption that the key parameter of interest, which summarizes labor market conditions, is market tightness de…ned as the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, = v=u. The rate at which vacant jobs meet unemployed workers is given by:
where q is a decreasing function of . Similarly the rate at which unemployed workers …nd jobs is:
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The elasticity of the matching function, to which I will subsequently refer, is de…ned as:
The other main feature of the Mortensen-Pissarides model is that the productivity of a match is subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Production starts at maximal productivity, normalized to 1. The idea is that recruiting …rms are prosperous and initially provide their employees with the best available technology. 8 At Poisson rate , the match is hit and a new productivity x 2 [ ; 1] is randomly drawn from c.d.f. G(x). The match dissolves if the new productivity is below a threshold R, to be determined. Additional details will be given as the optimal policy is being derived.
First-Best Policy
The optimal policy is derived in two steps. First, I characterize the optimal allocation of resources chosen by a benevolent social planner. Then, I turn to its implementation in a decentralized economy with free entry of risk-neutral …rms.
Optimal Allocation
The optimal allocation maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function subject to a resource constraint and to the search frictions that characterize the labor market. It is therefore the solution to the following problem:
where stands for the planner's (or workers') discount rate, w for the net wage that an employee receives, z for the value of leisure, b for unemployment bene…ts, y for the aggregate output of the economy and c for the ‡ow cost of posting a vacancy. The in- 7 Note that is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the number of unemployed, i.e. stantaneous utility function of risk-averse workers is denoted by 9 v(:), which is increasing and concave. The planner's objective is to maximize intertemporal social welfare, which, following a utilitarian criteria, is composed, at each instant, of the instantaneous utility of u unemployed and 1 u employed workers 10 . The …rst constraint depicts the dynamics of unemployment, driven by the di¤erence between the job destruction ‡ow and the job creation ‡ow. A match dissolves when it is hit by an idiosyncratic shock that generates a new productivity below the threshold R, which occurs at rate G(R). This rate of job destruction applies to the mass 1 u of existing matches. Job creation is simply equal to the rate at which unemployed workers …nd jobs, q( ), multiplied by the mass u of job seekers. It should be emphasized that this …rst constraint captures the fact that even the social planner is subject to matching frictions. The second constraint gives the dynamics of aggregate output, y. At each instant, q( )u new matches are formed and each of these has a productivity of 1. The 1 u existing jobs are hit at rate by idiosyncratic shocks which destroy their current productivity and replaces it, in case of survival, by a randomly drawn number greater or equal to the threshold R. Finally, any feasible allocation must satisfy the economy's resource constraint. The expenses, composed of the wages paid to the employed and the bene…ts paid to the unemployed, cannot exceed total output net of the resources allocated to recruitment, which amount to a ‡ow cost c paid for each of the u vacancies. The planner's control variables are market tightness , threshold productivity R, net wage w and unemployment bene…ts b. The state variables are unemployment u and aggregate output y. The planner's problem is straightforward to solve using standard optimal control techniques. The …rst characteristic of the optimal allocation is perfect insurance for workers:
which follows directly from risk aversion, i.e. from the concavity of v(:). This could be combined with the resource constraint, (6c), to give the optimal value of w and b:
9 In the previous section v denoted the number of vacancies. However, this variable will not appear in the rest of the text (except when I de…ne the matching function under moral hazard in the last section of the paper). I focus instead on and u and, where needed, v is just replaced by u. 10 An alternative would be to maximize the weighted average between the expected utility of an employed and of an unemployed worker. Such objective function would be more appropriate for political economy work focusing on the con ‡ict between insiders and outsiders. However, without time discounting, this would be identical to the planner's objective retained in this paper.
Note that perfect insurance necessitates a replacement ratio smaller than one whenever the value of leisure, z, is strictly positive. The optimal value of and R is implicitly determined by the following two …rst-order conditions:
where ( ) denotes the elasticity of the matching function, cf. equation (4) . These two optimality conditions are exactly identical to the one derived in Pissarides (2000, chapter 8) for net 11 output maximization. This is not surprising as, when nothing prevents the provision of full insurance, the best that the planner can do is to maximize output. The …rst equation, (10), corresponds to optimal job creation. The cost of job creation consists of the ‡ow cost of having a vacancy, c, multiplied by the expected time that has to be spent before a worker could be found, 1=q( ). The value of a newly created match is equal to (1 R)=( + ). However, optimally, recruitment costs should only absorb a fraction 1 ( ) of this value, otherwise there is too much job creation and an excessive amount of resources is allocated to recruitment. Equation (11) gives optimal job destruction. In the static context of Blanchard Tirole (2008) , the optimal threshold is just equal to the value of leisure, i.e. R = z. Making the model dynamic yields two extra terms. First, when a low productivity job is destroyed, the corresponding worker returns to unemployment with the hope of …nding a new job with productivity 1. To make this explicit, the corresponding term of equation (11) could be rewritten, using (10) , as:
This says that, once a job is destroyed, an unemployed worker gets matched at rate q( ) which generates a social value of (1 R)=( + ) net of the expected recruitment cost c=q( ). In other words, the threshold R has to be su¢ ciently high to induce an e¢ cient reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs. The second additional term to the expression for the optimal threshold R corresponds to the option value of a match. Even if current productivity is very low, keeping the match alive preserves the option of being hit by an idiosyncratic shock that restores a pro…table level of productivity. The option value decreases the optimal threshold R. The optimal allocation of resources chosen, in steady state, by a benevolent social planner is characterized by the …rst-order conditions (7), (10) and (11) together with the constraints (6a), (6b) and (6c) with _ u = _ y = 0.
Implementation
Having characterized the optimal allocation, I now turn to its implementation in a decentralized economy. Four stages of interest could be distinguished.
Stage 1: The government chooses the level of unemployment bene…ts b, payroll taxes , layo¤ taxes F and hiring subsidies H.
Stage 2: Entrepreneurs decide whether or not to create a …rm with a vacant position.
Stage 3: Once a match occurs, the employer and employee agree on a wage rate.
Stage 4: Firms choose a threshold productivity R below which a match hit by an idiosyncratic shock dissolves.
I now proceed by backward induction and start by determining the threshold R chosen by a risk-neutral employer. The asset value of a producing …rm with productivity x, J(x), solves the following Bellman equation:
where r denotes the interest rate, w the net wage that the worker receives and w + the gross wage paid by the employer. Note that, in this framework, the planner's discount rate does not have to coincide with the economy's interest rate r. This Bellman equation states that, for a …rm, the ‡ow return from having a …lled job with productivity x is equal to the instantaneous surplus it generates to which the possibility of a change in productivity should be added. An idiosyncratic shock destroys the value of the …rm at the current productivity and replaces it by either a corresponding expression, if the new productivity is above the threshold, or by the cost of layo¤ 12 , if the match is to be destroyed. As J(x) is strictly increasing in x, employers'chosen threshold R is determined by:
This says that, at the threshold, employers are indi¤erent between closing down and continuing the relationship. Simple algebra 13 on (13) and (14) gives the expression for the value of R chosen by …rms:
The threshold productivity is smaller than the cost of labor because of the …ring tax and of the option value of continuing the match. Note that, for this to be possible, …rms must be able to borrow and lend from perfect …nancial markets, an assumption that is maintained throughout this paper. Equation (15) is our …rst implementability constraint. Let us now turn to the determination of the wage rate that occurs at Stage 3. The formation of a match generates a surplus that needs to be shared between the two parties. But, from equation (7), optimality requires that the net wage paid to a worker, w, is equal to the wage equivalent of being unemployed, z + b. This leads to following lemma:
Lemma 1 A necessary condition to implement the …rst-best allocation is that workers are wage takers and that all the surplus from matches is captured by …rms. This ensures that, as desired:
The intuition for this result is straightforward. If workers have some bargaining power, they will obtain a mark-up over and above their outside option which is the income they get while unemployed. But this prevents the provision of full insurance which is a characteristic of a …rst-best allocation. 14 Clearly, with a binding resource constraint (6c) and perfect insurance, the optimal values of w and b are still given by (8) and (9), respectively. In the context of this paper, the requirement that workers have no bargaining power could also be seen as part of the optimal policy to be implemented 15 . For example, the labor market could be organized in such a way that …rms and workers …rst meet without exchanging any information on the wage rate. Then, …rms make a take-it-orleave-it o¤er to workers. Note that, here, a minimum wage would be detrimental to insurance. Excessive monopsony power of …rms should rather be dealt with traditional policy instruments such as payroll and layo¤ taxes, hiring subsidies and unemployment bene…ts. 16 Finally, the following corollary is an immediate consequence of the above lemma:
The …rst-best allocation cannot be implemented when the Hosios condition holds, i.e. when the bargaining power of workers is equal the elasticity of the matching function ( ).
The Hosios condition balances search externalities on both sides of the market such that, without government intervention, output is maximized. It is, however, inconsistent with the provision of perfect insurance. Since the optimal allocation of resources is characterized by output maximization, cf. (10) and (11), and workers have zero bargaining power, the optimal policy will correct the rates of job creation and job destruction for the failure of the Hosios condition to hold. Stage 2 is solved by assuming free entry. Vacancies keep being created by entrepreneurs until the returns from doing so reduce to zero. More formally, the value of a vacant position, V , solves:
This states that the return from a vacancy consists of the ‡ow cost of recruitment, c, and of the possibility of …lling the position at rate q( ) which yields the value of an active …rm with productivity 1. The employer also quali…es for a hiring subsidy, H, when he hires a worker. Free entry implies:
The amount of job creation could then be determined by plugging (18) into (17) and by using the value of J(1) deduced from (13) and (14). This gives:
The left hand side is the value of a new match to a …rm, J(1); while the right hand side corresponds to the expected cost of recruiting a worker. Equation (19) is our second implementability condition. At Stage 1, the government needs to choose the optimal policy. The corresponding implementability condition is the usual government budget constraint:
Revenues consist of payroll taxes paid by employed workers and of layo¤ taxes applied to the job destruction ‡ow; while the expenses are the payment of bene…ts to the unemployed 16 See Cahuc Laroque (2009) for a similar argument in a redistributive context. and of hiring subsidies to the ‡ow of newly created jobs.
It is now straightforward to …nd the optimal policy by matching the implementability conditions to the equations that characterize the …rst-best allocation. More speci…cally, (19) should be combined with (10) and (15) with (11). This gives:
where and R are jointly determined by (10) and (11). These are key equations characterizing the optimal policy in the benchmark model. They ensure that the rate of job creation and job destruction prevailing in the decentralized economy coincide with the planner's optimum. These conditions have a potentially insightful interpretation. Let us start with the implementation of the optimal level of job creation, (21) . Under free entry, …rms should only capture a fraction 1 ( ) of the surplus from a match; otherwise, entry is too high and too many resources are allocated to recruitment. However, employers have all the bargaining power and this must be o¤set by setting a …ring tax that exceeds the hiring subsidy in order to reduce job creation to an e¢ cient level. The second term is just a correction in case the planner's discount rate di¤ers from the market interest rate r. If the planner is more patient than market participants, < r, then the social value of a new match exceeds the private value perceived by entrepreneurs. This problem is addressed by raising the hiring subsidy for a given …ring tax. Condition, (21) , could also be seen as a correction for the failure of the Hosios condition to hold. If it did hold, then output maximization would only require F = H.
Let us now turn to the interpretation of the equation implementing the optimal level of job destruction, (22) . As can be seen from (15), a layo¤ tax only a¤ects the threshold R if …rms discount the future, r > 0. Indeed, any match will eventually be destroyed and, hence, by not laying o¤ its worker now, the …rm is only postponing the payment of the tax. Thus the relevant cost imposed by the layo¤ tax is rF , rather than just F .
A …rm that dismisses its worker imposes a double externality on the …nancing of unemployment insurance. First, the worker will qualify for bene…ts and, second, he will no longer contribute to its funding by paying payroll taxes. The layo¤ tax should therefore be su¢ ciently high to ensure that employers internalize these e¤ects. This is the main message of Blanchard Tirole (2008) 17 . The additional insight that is obtained by extending the analysis to a dynamic context is that there is also a social bene…t from laying o¤ a worker: it allows a desirable reallocation of this worker from a low to a high productivity job. This is captured by the third term of equation (22) which was given an intuitive interpretation when the optimal allocation was derived, cf. equation (12) . This e¤ect reduces the net social cost of dismissal and, hence, the level of the optimal layo¤ tax. Again, from an output maximization perspective, the condition for optimal job destruction implicitly corrects for the failure of the Hosios condition to hold. If it did hold, then wages would be su¢ ciently high for this third term to drop out of the equation. Finally, if = r, then the option value of keeping the match alive is properly taken into account by …rms and therefore does not a¤ect the size of the optimal layo¤ tax. However, a correction is needed if the planner's discount factor di¤ers from the interest rate. For example, if the planner is more patient than entrepreneurs, < r, then the option value is larger for the social planner than for …rms and, hence, the layo¤ tax needs to be raised. The level of payroll taxes is simply pinned down by the remaining implementability constraint, i.e. by the government budget constraint, (20) . Using the fact that, in steady state, the job creation ‡ow is equal to the job destruction ‡ow, (1 u) G(R) = u q( ), we obtain:
An important insight from this analysis is that the job destruction side of the economy determines the level of layo¤ taxes, F ; while the job creation side determines the di¤erence between layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies, F H. Note that this result is fundamentally due to the implementability conditions, (15) and (19) , and will therefore remain true in all extensions of the benchmark model. An important implication, which follows from (23) , is that the share of unemployment bene…ts …nanced from payroll taxes is essentially determined from the job creation side of the economy, a margin that is absent from Blanchard Tirole (2008) . Further insights on the optimal level of payroll taxes could be gained by replacing F H in (23) by its value from (21), which, after some straightforward rearrangement using (10), yields:
The ‡ow of unemployment bene…ts, b, constitutes the social cost of having an unemployed worker. The second term represents the corresponding social bene…t. Indeed, at rate q( ), an unemployed …nds a job which generates a social value equal to the expected pro…ts from production net of the recruitment costs. If r > , the value of a match to an entrepreneur is smaller than its social value. This should be o¤set by having su¢ ciently large hiring subsidies. But this is costly to the government and, hence, payroll taxes need to be raised accordingly.
Since the optimal rate of unemployment should ensure that the social bene…ts from joblessness is not too distant from its social cost, we expect the …rst two terms in (24) to be close to each other. In fact, with time discounting, we expect the …rst term to be slightly larger than the second one since the bene…t will only be realized in the future. This intuition is formally con…rmed by rewriting the expression for the payroll tax, (24) , as:
This expression is derived in Appendix A. Hence, without time discounting, i.e. = r = 0, payroll taxes are not part of the …rst-best policy. In this case, both unemployment insurance and hiring subsidies should be …nanced, exclusively, from layo¤ taxes. The intuition is that the optimal rate of unemployment is such that the social cost is equal to the social bene…t of having an unemployed worker. The key element is that, with free entry and zero bargaining power to workers, the social bene…t is entirely captured by the government as …scal revenue. Similarly, the social cost, i.e. the unemployment bene…ts, is a government expense. Hence, the two cancel out of the budget constraint and payroll taxes could be set equal to zero.
The optimal policy could now be fully characterized.
Proposition 1 When workers are wage takers, the …rst-best allocation could be implemented by choosing the policy instruments b, H, F and that satisfy equations (9), (21), (22) and (25) .
Knowing that the …rst-best allocation is implementable, we could derive the equilibrium rate of unemployment by setting _ u = 0 in the equation determining the dynamics of unemployment, (6a). This yields the well known expression:
This equation nevertheless has an interesting new interpretation in this framework. Whereas, for optimal values of and R, this is the output maximizing rate of unemployment 18 with risk-neutral workers; here, given the microfoundations laid in terms of risk-averse workers, this is the optimal rate of unemployment. Not only could unemployment be too low from an output maximization perspective, it could also be too low from a welfare point of view, which is conceptually very di¤erent.
Financing of Public Expenditures
A characteristic of employment protection in the proposed framework is that it generates some revenue to the government. Thus, a natural question to ask is whether layo¤ taxes should be higher when governmental expenditures are higher. This question is particularly interesting in a second-best environment where the …nancing of public expenditures distorts the labor supply decision of workers. I therefore add a participation margin to the previous model. People who choose to remain out of the labor force enjoy a dollar value of leisure equal to l. The distribution of l across agents in the economy is given by the c.d.f. K(l). Thus, there exists a threshold l such that agents choose to work if and only if their value of leisure l is smaller or equal to l. In a decentralized economy, the value of the threshold l is privately chosen by workers.
Optimal Allocation
As in the previous section, I begin by determining the optimal allocation of resources. The population is normalized to 1. Let I denote the number of people out of the labor force, N the number of employed workers and U that of unemployed. We clearly have
The optimal allocation is the solution to: max f ;R;b;w; lg
where Y stands for aggregate production and E for the resources allocated to the public expenditures. It is assumed that non-participating workers are not eligible for unemployment bene…ts. 19 Note that the dynamic evolution of employment N is used as a constraint, (28a), instead of that of unemployment U . In fact, here, the number of unemployed, U = K( l) N , is not a state variable as non-working agents who decide to enter the labor force have to transit through unemployment. Conversely, with less than full insurance, marginal workers who decide to leave the labor force must be unemployed.
The above formulation implicitly assumes that this is still the case with perfect insurance. In other words, U is not a state variable as it jumps when the control variable l jumps. The optimality conditions are identical to those of the previous section. Perfect insurance is still desirable, which combined with the resource constraint (28c), gives:
The optimal values of and R are still determined by equations (10) and (11) . The only novelty is the condition for the optimal participation threshold l, which in steady state, is:
Without public expenditures, E = 0, and with perfect insurance, we would expect to obtain l = w = z + b. But, as can be seen from the …rst term on the RHS of (31), such is not the case when the planner discounts the future, i.e. when > 0. The intuition for w = z + b > l is that, initially, when a person enters the labor force, he becomes unemployed and quali…es for unemployment bene…ts, which is costly to the government, while he will only become productive in a more distant future. Conversely, if we had assumed that the transition was directly from outside the labor force to employment, without intervening unemployment, we would have obtained w = z + b < l since, in this case, the marginal worker is producing and therefore relaxes the resource constraint, (28c). Anyway, the …rst term of the RHS of (31) is not very interesting for our purpose and would vanish by assuming either = 0 or that workers enter the labor force with a probability u of being unemployed and 1 u of being employed, where u = (K( l) N )=K( l) denotes the rate of unemployment. When E > 0, the interesting term in (31) is the last one. When some public expenditures need to be …nanced, it is desirable to have a larger share of the population working,
This increases the number of households who contribute to the …nancing of the government expenditures. In other words, the social value of participation, l, is larger than the private value that a worker derives, w = z + b. The failure of workers to internalize the entire social value of their participation decision explains why, as we shall see, it is not possible to implement a …rst-best allocation of resources in a decentralized economy.
Optimal Policy
I now turn to the determination of the optimal policy in an economy where workers have no bargaining power, i.e. where w = z + b. The implementability constraints for job destruction and job creation are the same as before, i.e. (15) and (19) , respectively. Public expenditures, E, should be added to the government budget constraint which then becomes:
The novelty is that workers privately choose whether to participate or not and the government cannot in ‡uence this decision by taxing the leisure of non-participating individuals. Thus, workers will only participate if their value of leisure, l, is lower than the income they get while participating. This yields a new implementability constraint for l which, under perfect insurance, is 20 :
But, this cannot be reconciled with the …rst-best choice of l given by equation (31) . Hence, the …rst-best allocation is not implementable here. The optimal policy is instead derived by adding the implementability constraints to the planner's problem. Now, (27) should be maximized under the previous constraints (28a), (28b), (28c), the equilibrium wage when workers have no bargaining power, i.e. w = z + b, and the binding implementability constraint (33) . This yields the optimal second-best policy. Strictly speaking, the other implementability constraints, (15) , (19) and (32), should also be included. However, they can be safely omitted as they form a system of three equations in three unknowns, , F and H, which do not appear elsewhere in the problem.
I have just described how the optimal policy should be derived when workers have no bargaining power. But note that, in a second-best environment, it is not clear that perfect insurance is still desirable. Hence, the corresponding policy might not be second-best but third-best. 21 To check this, the above problem should be solved without imposing any restriction on the net wage w, which could then be treated as a control variable. Importantly, the implementability constraint for l needs to be changed; (33) should now be replaced by:
which says that the marginal worker's utility from not participating must be equal to the expected utility from unemployment. It turns out that, with no discounting, = 0, perfect insurance is still desirable. With discounting, > 0, insurance should be less than perfect in order to deter the entry of new workers who would initially all be unemployed and would all qualify for unemployment bene…ts. This is related to the …rst term on the RHS of equation (31), which, as previously argued, is not really interesting. What is important is that, as far as the government expenditures E are concerned, the impossibility of implementing the …rst-best level of participation does not justify any departure from perfect insurance. This is intuitive since the suboptimally low level of participation is due to the existence of a wedge between the social and the private return from work which can only be worsen by under-providing insurance to workers.
Let us now turn to the characteristics of the optimal policy when workers are wage takers. Under perfect insurance, the level of bene…ts b is still given by equation (30) which in steady state, _ N = _ Y = 0, simpli…es to:
where u denotes the rate of unemployment and y the level of output per participant, i.e.
Y =K( l).
It turns out that the optimal value of the threshold R and market tightness are still determined by the …rst-best conditions (10) and (11) . The implementability constraints for job creation and job destruction being the same as before, i.e. (15) and (19) , the optimal level of hiring subsidies H and layo¤ taxes F are still given by (21) and (22) . Finally, the level of payroll taxes is determined by (32) which, in steady state, could be written as:
where the second line was derived by substituting expression (35) for the optimal level of unemployment bene…ts. Clearly, from (35) and (36), b + is una¤ected by the level of public expenditures. Hence, from (22) , layo¤ taxes remain unchanged; furthermore, from (21), hiring subsidies also remain unchanged. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The amount of public expenditures, E, has no e¤ect on the optimal level of layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies.
The public expenditures are entirely …nanced through higher payroll taxes and lower unemployment bene…ts. This result might seem surprising as, in a second-best environment, intuition suggests that two small distortions are preferable to a single large one. This should have led us to expect that the public expenditures should be partly …nanced from layo¤ taxes. Such is not the case. In fact, this is a consequence of the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) production e¢ ciency result according to which optimal taxes never lead to any deviation from production e¢ ciency as this would add some distortions without correcting the existing ones. This result applies since the rate of job creation and job destruction could be seen as being part of the aggregate production function of the economy. Hence, layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies should be viewed as Pigouvian instruments used to correct for externalities induced by the decisions of entrepreneurs, not as a general source of revenue for the government. 22 
Limits to Insurance
It has so far been assumed that workers could be perfectly insured against the risk of becoming unemployed. Following Blanchard Tirole (2008) , I now consider the possibility that there is a non-insurable utility cost B > 0 of unemployment. This speci…cation is consistent with …ndings from the happiness literature which has provided extensive evidence that unemployment has a long-lasting negative e¤ect on life satisfaction; see, for example, Clark Diener Georgellis Lucas (2008). The social planner's problem now becomes:
subject to
where the constraints remain unchanged. Equations (8), (9) and (10) still characterize the optimal allocation. Importantly, it remains desirable to equalize the marginal utility of consumption across di¤erent states and, hence, to have w = z + b. Thus, B is said to be non-insurable as it does not a¤ect marginal utilities and should therefore not be compensated by higher consumption during unemployment. The only di¤erence to the optimal allocation is that the condition for optimal job destruction, (11) , is replaced by:
Now that workers cannot be perfectly insured against unemployment, it is desirable to decrease the threshold productivity below which a job is destroyed. Implementing the optimal wage is not as straightforward as before. Indeed, if workers have zero bargaining power, their wage rate is determined by v(w) = v(z + b) B, which is not desirable as the marginal utility of consumption would then be higher when employed than when unemployed. The optimal policy could nevertheless be implemented when workers have su¢ ciently low bargaining power by setting a binding minimum wage equal to z + b. 23 Or, alternatively, if the wage rate is exogenously …xed such as to satisfy the resource constraint (38c), by enforcing the optimal level of unemployment bene…ts given by (9) . Since the implementability constraints for job destruction (15) , job creation (19) and the government budget constraint (20) are not a¤ected by the utility cost of being unemployed, it is straightforward to derive the optimal policy. F H remains given by (21) and by (23) . The only modi…cation is that F now solves:
Layo¤ taxes need to be raised 24 in order to implement the new optimal threshold which is lower than before. Although a similar result has already been derived by Blanchard and Tirole (2008) , the interpretation is slightly richer in a dynamic context. The optimal policy implements a lower productivity threshold R and, hence 25 , a higher market tightness . This induces a decline in the rate of job destruction, G(R), and a rise in the rate of job creation, q( ), which unambiguously leads to a lower equilibrium rate of unemployment. It is interesting to note that the optimal job creation condition (10) is only indirectly a¤ected, through R, by the non-insurable utility cost of being unemployed B. This suggests that the planner primarily tries to reduce job destruction while leaving job creation unchanged. This is implemented by an increase in layo¤ taxes together with a corresponding adjustment in hiring subsidies such as to restore an optimal rate of job creation. The key new feature of the optimal policy is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A higher non-insurable utility cost of being unemployed, B, is associated with a lower optimal rate of unemployment.
When insurance cannot be perfect, reducing the number of jobless is a substitute to the provision of unemployment bene…ts. 26 This policy nevertheless comes at a cost as
. Hence, strictly speaking, F is decreasing in R if and only if g(R) [1 R] < 1. For example, this condition is always satis…ed for a uniform distribution of idiosyncratic shocks. 25 If the elasticity of the matching function is not constant, a su¢ cient condition for to be increasing
This could be seen by totally di¤erentiating the optimal job creation condition (10) with respect to B and by using the fact that dR=dB < 0.
26 This is reminiscent of the over-employment result of the implicit contract literature; see Baily (1974a) and Azariadis (1975) . the lower threshold R hinders the reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs and, hence, net output is no longer maximized. It follows that purchasing power is now lower for both the employed and the unemployed. This case clearly highlights the conceptual distinction between the output maximizing rate of unemployment and the welfare maximizing optimal rate of unemployment.
Finally, it is possible to compute the optimal level of payroll taxes by replacing b and F H by their optimal values in the steady state government budget constraint, (23). This yields:
With no discounting. i.e. = r = 0, payroll taxes are negative. The intuition is that the social cost of unemployment now exceeds the corresponding budgetary cost to the government as, without perfect insurance, the social cost of having an unemployed worker is larger than the level of bene…ts to which he quali…es. However, the social planner still equates the social cost to the social bene…t of unemployment and, hence, the budgetary bene…t, q( )(F H); now exceeds the budgetary cost, b. This generates a surplus that allows the implementation of negative payroll taxes or, equivalently, of positive employment subsidies.
Workers with Bargaining Power
Under risk aversion, it is desirable to suppress any ‡uctuations in income between employment and unemployment. Thus, the implementation of a …rst-best allocation requires workers to have zero bargaining power, as stated in Lemma 1. However, it could be objected that workers fundamentally do have some bargaining power and that this cannot be in ‡uenced by the planner. Thus, when solving for the optimal policy, the expression for the wage rate resulting from the bargaining process should be added to the implementability constraints. The resulting planner's problem yields …rst-order conditions which are hardly interpretable. Hence, I perform a reasonable calibration of the model and report numerical evaluations of the optimal policy for di¤erent values of the bargaining power of workers.
An obvious limitation of the analysis of this section is that it does not allow for private savings. When workers have some bargaining power, their income ‡uctuates over time which should induce them to borrow and save through a risk-free asset in order to smooth their consumption over time. It should nevertheless be acknowledged that, in practice, workers are often liquidity constrained, as shown by Card Chetty Weber (2007) and Chetty (2008) , and that assuming unrestricted risk-free borrowing and lending might be even more remote from reality than assuming that workers have to consume their cash-on-hand at each instant.
No Commitment: Surplus Splitting
With bargaining, wages typically depend on worker's outside opportunities which are a¤ected by a number of endogenous parameters. In order to address these e¤ects, I …rst propose to implement the optimal policy in a decentralized economy where wages are determined by surplus splitting as in Mortensen-Pissarides (1994 . Thus, workers get a proportion of the dollar amount of the surplus from the match. It could, fairly, be objected that worker's risk aversion should be explicitly taken into account in the wage bargaining process. However, in the absence of commitment, the resulting bargaining problem would be intractable. Thus, surplus splitting could seen as a proxy for the outcome of the wage bargaining process without commitment. Also, splitting the surplus in …xed proportions does not seem completely implausible 27 and has the important advantage of yielding closed form solutions for the wage rates. This transparently shows how wages are a¤ected by the endogenous variables of the model. Wages are bargained over each time a productivity shock occurs. The initial net wage, denoted w 0 (1), is di¤erent from others since, in case no agreement is reached, the …rm does not receive the hiring subsidy but does not have to pay the …ring tax 28 . By contrast, subsequent bargaining is not a¤ected by the subsidy, which is sunk, but does respond to the cost of laying o¤ a worker. The resulting net wage is denoted by w(x) for a match of productivity x. The corresponding expressions are:
where it is assumed that workers and …rm both discount future income at rate r. Details on the surplus splitting rules and on the value functions of workers and …rms used to derive these expressions are given in Appendix B. 29 An attractive feature of these wage rates is that they capture the fact that, initially, the hiring subsidy increases the bargaining power of workers while the …ring tax decreases it; while, subsequently, the hiring subsidy is sunk and the …ring tax put workers in a stronger position. Also, importantly, a higher market tightness reduces the length of unemployment which improves the outside option of workers and, hence, their wages. Proceeding as in the …rst section, it is easy to show that the job destruction condition, determined by J(R) = F , is now given by:
while the job creation condition, resulting from free entry V = 0, is:
Note that these two expressions generalize the previous implementability conditions. Indeed, for = 0, (44) and (45) reduce to (15) and (19), respectively. With ‡uctuating wages, it is clearly impossible to implement the …rst-best allocation. The optimal policy should therefore be solved directly under the implementability constraints, i.e. under the decentralized job destruction, (44) , and job creation, (45), conditions and under the government budget constraint, (20) . The corresponding optimization problem is: max f ;R;b; ;F;Hg
where n denotes the number of matches which have not been hit by an idiosyncratic shock yet and with prevailing wage w 0 (1). The second constraint, (47b), depicts the dynamics of n. Clearly, the expressions for the wage rate, (42) and (43), should be substituted into the maximization problem where needed. As the resulting …rst-order conditions are extremely heavy and hardly interpretable, I now rely on a numerical calibration of the model. (2003), except for risk aversion which does not appear in their model. Thus, I take a Cobb-Douglas matching function, which reduces to:
I use the same functional forms and parameter values as in Mortensen Pissarides
It clearly implies that the matching function has a constant elasticity, . The distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is assumed to be uniform on [ ; 1]; hence its c.d.f. is:
Finally, I use a standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) instantaneous utility function with CRRA coe¢ cient :
The chosen exogenous parameter values are displayed in Table 1 , where the unit of time is a quarter. The calibration results are reported for four di¤erent values of the bargaining power of workers, . The initial case, = 0, corresponds to the …rst-best benchmark. The 30 When = and with no government intervention other than the provision of some unemployment bene…ts, b = 0:2, entirely …nanced from payroll taxes, the chosen calibration implies that the equilibrium rate of unemployment, u, is 6.56%, the expected length of unemployment, 1= q( ), is 0.91 quarter and the expected duration of a match, 1= G(R), is 12.93 quarters. These values are within the empirically plausible range reported by Shimer (2007 Welfare loss is computed as the proportional decline in consumption in the …rst-best case necessary to reach the new level of welfare. For example, when = 0:5, welfare is equal to what it would be in the …rst-best allocation, = 0, with consumption decreased by 1.78%. In steady state, the gross job ‡ow is given by u q( ) or, equivalently, by (1 u) G(R). Finally, the last row reports the share of unemployment insurance expenses …nanced by payroll taxes. When the Hosios condition holds, i.e. when = 0:5, the output maximizing policy should not distort job creation or job destruction and, therefore, requires F = H. As shown in Table 2 , such policy is not welfare maximizing with risk-averse agents. Thus, when workers have some bargaining power, there is a trade-o¤ between output maximization and insurance provision. More precisely, the planner wants to reduce market tightness in order to decrease wages which, by relaxing the resource constraint, allows an increase in the level of unemployment bene…ts. He therefore set layo¤ taxes higher than hiring subsidies in order to reduce entry. An additional reason to decrease hiring subsidies is to further reduce the initial wage rate, w 0 (1), to which 60% of the workers qualify.
Due to the resource constraint, the level of unemployment bene…ts decreases with the bargaining power of workers. Also, F is so much higher than H that it generates su¢ cient surpluses to …nance entirely the unemployment bene…ts as well as some employment subsidies, reported as negative payroll taxes. However, for all values of , the magnitude of F only corresponds to about two months of the average wage of the economy. This is more than su¢ cient to pay for the unemployment bene…ts given that, either, is low and the expected length of unemployment is short, or, is high and the replacement ratio is low.
The reservation threshold R declines with bargaining power in order to compensate for the imperfect provision of insurance and for the high length of unemployment induced by the low market tightness. But, this comes at the cost of a more sclerotic labor market characterized by a lower reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs, as shown by the lower gross job ‡ow. The reduction in the rate of job creation being larger than that of job destruction, unemployment increases with . Output, which in steady state can be written as y = (1 u)
, declines because a smaller number of people work, i.e. unemployment is higher, and the average productivity of employed workers is also reduced due to a lower reservation threshold.
In other words, the downward adjustment in and R, which enhances the provision of insurance, hinders the reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs, which reduces aggregate output. This is the essence of the trade-o¤ between insurance and production. Also, it should be emphasized that a moderate amount of private savings is likely to reduce, but certainly not to eliminate, the demand for insurance. Thus, a trade-o¤ would remain, albeit of a smaller magnitude, and the key qualitative insights about the optimal policy would presumably remain unaltered.
How would the optimal policy change if wages were re-bargained immediately after recruitment? In this case, newly employed workers would get wage w(1) as given by (43) . In order to solve for the optimal policy with immediate wage renegotiation, it is important to note that the implementability condition for job destruction, (44) , and the government budget constraint, (20) , remain unchanged while the implementability condition for job creation now becomes:
Thus, the planner's problem is still as above, (46), with w 0 (1) from (42) replaced by w(1) from (43) and the job creation condition (47f) replaced by (51). The corresponding simulation results are shown in Table 3 . The allocation of resources is pretty similar to that of the previous case. The main di¤erence lies in the level of the policy instruments F , H and . There are two reasons for that. First, from the implementability condition (51), the di¤erence between hiring subsidies and layo¤ taxes has a larger impact on job creation than before. Indeed, with immediate renegotiation, these policy instruments have a smaller e¤ect on wages and, hence, a larger e¤ect on …rms. This explains why F H does not need to be as large as before to reduce to its desired level. The second reason is that hiring subsidies cease to increase initial wages and layo¤ taxes cease decrease them. Hence, when workers have a strong bargaining power, it is no longer necessary to maintain high layo¤ taxes and low hiring subsidies to prevent wages from being too high and unemployment bene…ts too low. Note that F H being smaller than before, a signi…cant share of the unemployment bene…ts now needs to be …nanced from payroll taxes.
To gain additional insights about the key trade-o¤s underpinning the optimal policy, let us consider the following naive surplus splitting rule:
Before going further, it should be emphasized that the intermediary case where w(x) = [x +c ]+(1 )[z+b] is quantitatively almost identical to the immediate renegotiation case as the term rF , in (43) , is small. Also note that, for a given allocation, the wage rate is lower under naive surplus splitting, (52), than under immediate renegotiation, (43) , as market tightness and layo¤ taxes cease to have a positive impact. This generates a mechanical improvement in the level of insurance. When solving for the optimal policy under naive surplus splitting, the implementability conditions remain given by (51) for job creation and by (20) for the government budget constraint while, for job destruction, it becomes:
The simulation results are presented in Table 4 . Strikingly, market tightness and the productivity threshold R are almost independent of the bargaining power of workers. This suggests that, without the general equilibrium e¤ect of market tightness on wages, there is hardly any trade-o¤ between output maximization and insurance provision. Consequently, the main role of layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies is to compensate for the failure of the Hosios condition to hold, i.e. to o¤set the distortions generated by the gap between the bargaining power of workers and the elasticity of the matching function. This explains why, when the Hosios condition does hold, i.e. when = 0:5, layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies are virtually equal to each other. The slight discrepancy that remains, and which result in payroll taxes covering 103.66% of the cost of providing unemployment insurance, rather than 100%, is due to the positive impact of payroll taxes on wages. Hence, the government tries to increase those taxes a little in order to decrease wages which, through a relaxation of the resource constraint, allows an improvement in the level of unemployment bene…ts.
Commitment: Fixed Wage
The previous subsection assumes that the dollar amount of the surplus from the match is split in …xed proportions between the worker and the …rm. However, this leads to substantial wage ‡uctuations which, if …rms can commit, seems inconsistent with the risk sharing that would be expected to occur between a risk-averse worker and a riskneutral employer. In particular, if a …rm and a worker discount the future at the same rate, i.e. r = , then the …rm will commit to paying a …xed wage, w, throughout the duration of the match and to a job destruction threshold, R.
The Bellman equations corresponding to the expected utility of an unemployed, U , and of an employed worker, W , are:
where, as before, v(:) stands for the instantaneous utility of consumption. The two parameters of the contract are determined ex-ante by Nash bargaining:
fw; Rg = arg max
where the subscript i is used to stress that the wage and threshold bargained in match i do not a¤ect the value of outside options, i.e. the values of U or V . Ex-ante bargaining implies that, if an agreement is not reached, the employer does not receive the hiring subsidy but does not have to pay the layo¤ tax. The worker's net salary is determined by:
while the job destruction threshold solves:
These two expressions are derived in Appendix C. The last term of the decentralized job destruction condition (58) would not appear without commitment, cf. (15) . This shows that …rms use both margins to provide insurance to risk-averse workers: they pay a constant wage and they lower the job destruction threshold. Using the free-entry condition, it could easily be shown that the decentralized job creation condition is:
The optimal policy could then be derived by adding the wage equation (57) as a constraint to the original problem. Thus, the planner should maximize (5) with respect to , R, b and w subject to (6a), (6b), (6c) and (57). The three remaining implementability constraints, (58), (59) and (20), could be left out since they jointly determine F , H and which do not appear elsewhere in the planner's problem. Table 5 displays the simulation results for the same calibrating of the model as before. Again, the case = 0 corresponds to the implementation of the …rst-best policy. As increases, and R both decline in order to partially o¤set the increase in the gap between w and b + z. Indeed, a higher market tightness puts workers in a stronger bargaining position which is detrimental to insurance. Also, a lower reservation threshold improves the welfare of employed workers and can be compensated by a smaller wage rate. The decline in the rate of job creation being stronger than that of job destruction, unemployment increases with . Output falls. Due to the resource constraint, the level of unemployment bene…ts decreases with .
When is low, F is higher than H in order to compensate for the failure of the Hosios condition to hold. As increases, this becomes a smaller concern, but insu¢ cient insurance becomes a bigger one. The planner therefore wants to decrease market tightness which becomes the main reason why F exceeds H. Also, layo¤ taxes are rapidly declining in and are lower than in the surplus splitting counterpart to this problem, cf. Table 2 . The reason is that, as could be seen from (58), …rms spontaneously decrease the destruction threshold R whenever insurance is less than perfect. Thus, layo¤ taxes have a smaller job to do to reduce the rate of job destruction to its optimal level. The surpluses generated by F H nevertheless remain su¢ ciently large to …nance almost all the unemployment bene…ts but leave no room for employment subsidies.
The wage and threshold could be determined by directed search, rather than by Nash bargaining. In such an environment, competitive market makers jointly choose the wage rate, the threshold and the length of queues, equal to 1= q( ), such as to maximize the expected utility of an unemployed worker subject to a free entry condition for …rms; or more formally:
This yields exactly the same equations as (57) and (58) with replaced by . Thus, in Table 5 , directed search corresponds to the case where = = 0:5. As implied by Corollary 1, directed search and the associated Hosios condition fail to implement a …rst-best allocation of resources in an economy with risk-averse workers as they fail to ensure a su¢ cient provision of insurance.
Moral Hazard
When workers have some bargaining power, there is typically a trade-o¤ between output maximization and insurance provision. But, reducing the level of insurance might be a virtue if it increases the search intensity of unemployed workers. Indeed, concerns about the moral hazard e¤ects of unemployment insurance have been at the heart of the literature on the topic. Hence, this section characterizes the optimal policy when job search monitoring is not available and, hence, when the unemployed freely choose their search intensity.
Determination of Search Intensity
Let s denote the search intensity of the unemployed. Vacant jobs and unemployed workers now get matched at rate 31 :
where the matching function satis…es the same properties as before. Vacancies become …lled at rate:
where market tightness remains de…ned as the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, i.e.
= v=u.
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Unemployed worker i who searches with intensity s i …nds a job at rate:
The Bellman equation associated with the expected utility of an unemployed worker is:
where denotes an increasing and convex cost of search, with (0) = 0 (0) = 0, and
is the value of a new job to a worker. The …rst-order condition for search intensity is:
Hence, using the symmetry which prevails in equilibrium, i.e. s i = s, the search intensity of unemployed workers is implicitly determined by:
Surplus Splitting
The optimal policy with moral hazard could now be solved numerically. For this, I focus on the case where wages are determined by surplus splitting as this is the most transparent situation about the in ‡uence of the di¤erent parameters on wages.
As before, I consider the wage rate that would prevail under surplus splitting if workers 31 The intensity of job advertising made by …rms with a vacancy is exogenously set to 1 as, even if endogenously determined, it would not be a¤ected by any policy parameters; cf. Pissarides (2000, chapter 5.3) . 32 Note that, by de…nition of the elasticity of the matching function , 
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and …rms were both risk-neutral. This gives:
where the initial wage, w 0 (1), applies until a shock occurs. The existence of the search cost (s) lowers the value of unemployment, which is the outside option, and hence adversely a¤ects wages. Under these wage rates, the search intensity of a risk-averse worker is determined by:
where the average utility of employed workers is given by:
These expressions are derived in Appendix D. The planner's problem is as before, (46), with s as a new control variable and (69) as an additional constraint. 33 For reference, I also solve for the optimal policy when the planner is able to freely set the wage of workers. Absent any constraints on the expression for the wage rate, this gives the best possible allocation that could be attained with endogenous search intensity. In that context, the …rst-order condition for search intensity is (69) with E[v(w)] simply replaced by v(w) where w is the wage chosen by the planner. Also, with a …xed wage, the decentralized job destruction and job creation conditions are given by (15) and (19), respectively.
Before solving for the optimal policy, it is necessary to recalibrate the version of the model which allows for moral hazard. The calibration is done in a context where = and where the government does not intervene except to provide some unemployment bene…ts, b = 0:2, …nanced from payroll taxes; which is arguably a good sketch of the current U.S. situation. The scale parameter of the matching function, q 0 , and the lower bound of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, , are set such that the quarterly rates of job creation and job destruction remain equal to 0.91 and 12.93, respectively. This gives q 0 = 0:83 and = 0:49. The cost of search is assumed to be convex:
The constant k is calibrated such that s is normalized to 1 and such that the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the bene…t level is equal to 0.5, a reasonable estimate according to Krueger and Meyer (2002) 's survey of the literature on the topic. This yields k = 1:16 and = 5:02. All the other parameters of the model are left unchanged.
The simulation results are presented in Table 7 . The …rst column reports the calibration for the optimal …xed wage, i.e. the "best wage", chosen by the planner. The welfare loss is now computed relative to this benchmark. Thus, for instance, the welfare generated by the optimal policy with surplus splitting when = 0:5 is identical to the welfare of the optimal allocation with a …xed wage but with consumption of the employed and unemployed decreased by 1.279%.
When the worker has a low bargaining power, = 0:125, market tightness is higher than with the best wage. In fact, the planner wants to increase wages, and reduce insurance, in order to boost the returns to search. Hiring subsidies, which have a positive impact on initial wages, are also set at a very high level. This is exactly the opposite to what would be recommended without moral hazard where market tightness would be reduced in order to improve the provision of insurance.
Welfare is maximized for = 0:2171, where the optimal allocation is very similar to that implied by the best wage. Market tightness is nevertheless a little higher which increases the recruitment costs but reduces the provision of insurance which is slightly too high compared to the best wage benchmark. The optimal setting of the policy instruments , F and H di¤ers substantially from that of the benchmark. This is due to the di¤erences in the implementability constraints, which are themselves caused by the di¤erent speci…cations of the wage rate. When = 0:2171, the low magnitude of the welfare loss, which is below 0.002%, suggests that, at the optimum, the surplus splitting rule hardly worsens the trade-o¤ between insurance and production, compared to the optimal …xed wage case. Indeed, the forces pushing for more insurance, i.e. risk aversion, and less insurance, i.e. moral hazard, nearly o¤set each other. Hence, given the prevailing level of insurance, the policy parameters could be set such as to maximize the reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs. Indeed, at the optimal , the reservation threshold R is close to being maximized.
For a higher bargaining power, market tightness does not need to be pushed upward as wages are already su¢ ciently high to reward search e¤orts. The previous intuitions, without moral hazard, dominate again and market tightness should be decreased in order to improve the provision of insurance. Thus, for high values of , the introduction of moral hazard does not really modify the qualitative conclusions reached in the previous section about the key characteristics of an optimal policy.
With immediate wage renegotiation, newly employed worker are paid w(1) as given by (68). The planner's problem is obtained by adding the constraint for search intensity, given by (69) with w(1) replacing w 0 (1) in (70), to the corresponding problem of the previous section. 34 The simulated optimal policy is shown in Table 8 . The optimal allocation is similar to that without immediate renegotiation, but the optimal setting of the policy instruments is now di¤erent. These di¤erences are similar to those between the corresponding tables without moral hazard; see Table 2 and 3. Welfare is maximized for = 0:2127. Again, when workers have substantial bargaining power, the introduction of moral hazard does not modify the main conclusions of the previous section as the primary concern of the planner remains the under-provision of insurance to workers.
Finally, to get some further insights, I consider the naive surplus splitting rule: 34 Appropriate adjustments for search intensity should be made as described in the previous footnote.
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The corresponding optimal policy with moral hazard is reported in Table 9 . The key problem of the planner is that naive surplus splitting generates too much insurance and there is hardly any way to undo this as the wage rate is largely independent of the parameters under the planner's control. There is a complementarity between market tightness and search intensity as they both increase the matching rate q( ; s). However, given the over-provision of insurance, search intensity is low and it is therefore not worth pushing market tightness upward. Also, since the unemployed are very ine¢ cient at searching for jobs, the reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs is long and costly and, hence, the threshold productivity R is reduced as it is now preferable to keep workers in low productivity occupations. However, as increases, the problem of over-insurance becomes less severe and welfare improves. As the level of insurance cannot really be in ‡uenced, the main e¤ect of layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies is to correct for the failure of the Hosios condition to hold. Hence, when = 0:5, both are approximately equal to each other.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have investigated optimal policies in a dynamic search model with riskaverse workers. More precisely, I have focused on the joint derivation of the optimal level of unemployment bene…ts, layo¤ taxes, hiring subsidies and payroll taxes.
I began by abstracting from moral hazard in order to focus on the general equilibrium e¤ects of the di¤erent policy instruments. I showed that the …rst-best allocation of resources can be implemented in a decentralized economy when workers are wage takers. In this situation, full insurance is provided and output is maximized. Layo¤ taxes are higher than hiring subsidies in order to o¤set the excessive entry of vacancies caused by the absence of bargaining power of workers. Moreover, the corresponding surplus is su¢ ciently large to …nance nearly all the unemployment bene…ts and payroll taxes are therefore hardly needed.
However, layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies should only be viewed as Pigouvian instruments used to correct externalities, not as a general source of revenue to the government. Indeed, additional public expenditures should be entirely …nanced through higher payroll, or income, taxes and lower unemployment bene…ts, even in a second-best environment with endogenous participation.
The analysis being properly microfounded in terms of risk-averse workers, it allows the determination of an optimal, welfare maximizing, rate of unemployment, which goes beyond the well-known output maximizing rate of unemployment. The distinction between the two becomes particularly relevant when there is a trade-o¤ between the provision of insurance and the maximization of production. For instance, the optimal rate of unemployment is lower when workers are confronted with a non-insurable utility cost of unemployment. Intuitively, a reduction in the probability of unemployment is a substitute to the provision of unemployment bene…ts.
When workers have some bargaining power, the planner wants to reduce wages in order to relax the resource constraint and improve the level of unemployment bene…ts. In particular, this is achieved by reducing market tightness which lowers wages, as desired, but also hinders the reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs. Introducing moral hazard adds a counteracting force to the model. When workers have a very low bargaining power, it is typically desirable to increase market tightness and to boost wages in order to enhance the reward to the search e¤ort of the unemployed. However, when workers have a more substantial bargaining power, under-provision of insurance, rather than moral hazard, remains the primary concern of the planner. Chetty (2008) has already argued that the issue of moral hazard might have been over-emphasized in the literature. The present paper adds to this by showing that general equilibrium effects on job creation, job destruction and wages might be at least as important for the determination of optimal policies.
There are essentially two reasons which could justify setting layo¤ taxes higher than hiring subsidies; in which case the di¤erence between the two could cover at least some of the costs of providing unemployment bene…ts. First, to compensate for the failure of the Hosios condition to hold; or, in other words, to reduce entry in order to save on the recruitment costs when the bargaining power of workers is lower than the elasticity of the matching function. Second, in order to reduce wages, by reducing market tightness and hiring subsidies, when the provision of insurance is insu¢ cient. Importantly, as the bargaining power of workers increases, the …rst reason becomes less relevant while the second becomes more important. This is why layo¤ taxes exceed hiring subsidies in all realistic calibrations of the model and for any bargaining power of workers.
This shows that, without governmental intervention, labor markets with search frictions generically implement an ine¢ cient allocation of resources. With risk-neutral workers, ine¢ ciencies are only due to unbalanced search externalities associated with deviations from the Hosios condition. Here, the ine¢ ciency is much deeper and involves a lack of insurance against the risk of becoming unemployed.
Some important issues are left for further research. First, an accurate empirical knowledge of the main determinants of wages, at the macroeconomic level, is key for the optimal design of labor market policies. 35 Knowing, quantitatively, how wages are a¤ected by market tightness or by the di¤erent policy instruments is obviously essential if the planner wants to increase the provision of insurance at the smallest cost in terms of output. The precise speci…cation of wages also crucially a¤ects the implementability constraints. For instance, if layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies are passed on to workers through adjustment in wages, then they have a much smaller e¤ect on the job creation and job destruction decisions of …rms. Throughout this paper, I have only considered time invariant policy instruments. In fact, in a dynamic context, it would be interesting to allow the level of unemployment bene…ts to be a¤ected by the length of unemployment and that of layo¤ taxes and hiring subsidies to depend on the age of the match, among other things. Also, in the proposed model, the length of unemployment does not directly matter, only its rate does. 36 This could be relaxed by assuming that the level of human capital depreciates during an unemployment spell 37 or, more simply, by assuming that workers have a preference for shorter spells even if this is associated with a higher probability of being unemployed. The length of unemployment being decreasing in market tightness, the resulting optimal policy would presumably advocate for a smaller reduction in the rate of job creation. 35 Blanch ‡ower and Oswald (1994) provide extensive evidence of the negative impact of unemployment on wages. However, their work does not control for the number of vacancies and, hence, cannot identify the impact of market tightness on wages. 36 The length of unemployment nevertheless has an impact on the speed of the reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs. 37 See the related analyses of Pavoni (2008) and Shimer Werning (2006) who determine the optimal unemployment insurance policy with human capital depreciation.
A Payroll Tax in First-Best Policy
Before deriving (25) , it is necessary to rewrite the expression for the optimal value of b given by equation (9) . The second line was derived by using the optimal job destruction condition (11) to get rid of z. The obtain the third line, and to get rid of the integral, I have used the expression for the steady state level of output y = (1 u)
sdG(s)
i and then rearranged the terms. Finally, to get the last line, I have used equation (12) to rewrite the second term of the third line and used the fact that, in steady state, G(R)(1 u) = q( )u to rewrite the third term of the third line. Substituting this expression for b in (24) and using again the expression for the steady state level of unemployment, G(R)(1 u) = q( )u, yields equation (25) .
B Wage Determination under Surplus Splitting
An entrepreneur expects a net present value V from the stream of income generated by a vacancy which will eventually become …lled; while an unemployed expectsŨ . The initial value of a match to a …rm and to a worker are denoted by J 0 (1) andW 0 (1), respectively. The corresponding subsequent values, after an idiosyncratic shock has reduced the productivity of the match to x, are J(x) andW (x). Importantly, as it is assumed that the dollar amount of the match surplus is split in …xed proportions between the worker and the …rm, the value functions of a worker, i.e.Ũ ,W 0 (1) andW (x), give his expected future earnings and abstract from risk aversion.
The Bellman equation for the value of a vacancy is:
which is the same as before, cf. equation (17) . The corresponding equation for the value of unemployment is:
The initial wage being denoted by w 0 (1), the initial value of match to a …rm and to a worker are, respectively, given by: 
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The surplus splitting rule from which the initial wage, w 0 (1), is derived is:
(1 )
where the …rm receives the hiring subsidy in case an agreement is reached. The corresponding rule for an existing match that has just been hit by an idiosyncratic shock resulting in productivity x, and from which w(x) is derived, is:
which takes into account the fact that, if the match dissolves, the …rm needs to pay the layo¤ tax.
C Nash Bargaining with Commitment
Before solving the bargaining problem, it is useful to determine the value of the …rm in match i at the job destruction threshold, J i (R i ). It could be deduced from the equation for J(x), (13) , that:
Plugging this expression back into (13) evaluated at productivity R i yields:
Thus:
and:
where g(R) dG(R)=dR. Similarly, it could be deduced from the value function of the employed worker, rW i = v(w i ) + G(R i ) [U W i ], that:
and: Finally, the …rst-order conditions for the wage w i and the threshold R i are obtained by di¤erentiating the logarithm of the Nash product in (56). This yields:
Using symmetry, i.e. dropping the subscript i, and substituting V = 0, J(1)+H = c=q( ),
and the above derivatives into these …rst-order conditions yields (57) and (58).
D Search Intensity under Surplus Splitting
When wages are given by (67) and (68), the value of employment to workers satis…es: where the former expression corresponds to newly employed workers and the latter to those who have already been hit by an idiosyncratic shock. Subtracting the former from the latter, I obtain:
Inserting this back into the expression for W 0 (1), yields: Finally, this should be substituted into the …rst-order condition for search intensity:
This yields (69) together with (70).
